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EMERGENCY BYLAWS: AN UNDERUTILIZED
TOOL FOR CORPORATE OPERATION
DURING AN EMERGENCY
GRACE MYERS
ABSTRACT
Emergency bylaws are an underutilized tool for corporate
governance whose importance has been highlighted by COVID-19.
Emergency bylaws can be included within corporations’ bylaws and
only operate during an “emergency” as defined by state statutes.
These provisions usually give boards more agency to act during an
emergency through mechanisms such as looser quorum and notice
requirements. These provisions will be increasingly important during future pandemics, wars, and global warming. However, few
corporations have these bylaws, and the current hodgepodge of state
statutes hinders their adoption. The current state of emergency
bylaws regulation and implementation raises some questions about
shareholder rights and disclosure requirements. States should
look to the newly updated Delaware Corporate Code provisions
for a better model of regulation, and corporations should adopt
provisions tailored to their needs.


JD Candidate, Class of 2022, William & Mary Law School; BA in Economics and French, Class of 2019, Hamilton College. I would like to thank
my parents, Tim and Wendy Myers, for their unending support. I dedicate
this to my late grandmother, Patricia Park, who was my biggest champion and
always said that I wasn’t allowed to forget her once I was a fancy, published
writer. I don’t think a note on emergency bylaws was quite what she meant,
but I haven’t once forgotten her.
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INTRODUCTION
The COVID-19 pandemic has shaken corporate governance
and exposed weaknesses in how companies operate during an
emergency,1 and yet one of the most powerful tools for governance
during an emergency—emergency bylaws—receives little attention.2 Emergency bylaws are provisions that companies can incorporate into their bylaws to supersede certain normal bylaw
provisions in the event of an emergency.3 These bylaws trigger
(become operational) only during an emergency and cease to become
operational once the emergency has ended.4 State law governs how
emergency bylaws work and sets the definition of an emergency.5
Many states also have emergency powers statutes, 6 which give
boards special powers automatically during an emergency.7
Emergency bylaw provisions adopted by individual corporations give companies wider agency to act as needed to ensure
continuity of management during an emergency situation.8 In fact,
several states have special emergency bylaw statutes that apply
only to domestic insurers and give “default” emergency bylaws if
insurance companies choose not to adopt their own, ensuring that
insurance companies in particular operate during an emergency.9
The importance of emergency bylaws was brought into
sharp relief during the COVID-19 pandemic, and as a result, law
firms and corporations have finally given more attention to this
underappreciated mechanism of corporate governance.10 COVID-19

1 See Michael Peregrine et al., The Long-Term Impact of the Pandemic on
Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 16, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/07/16/the-long-term-impact-of-the-pan
demic-on-corporate-governance [https://perma.cc/89G4-PQZY].
2 See Keith Bishop et al., Should Your Corporation Have Emergency Bylaws?,
JD SUPRA (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/should-your-corpo
ration-have-emergency-47585 [https://perma.cc/EMT3-KV4N].
3 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016).
4 Id.
5 Holly Gregory et al., Leadership Resiliency in an Emergency, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Apr. 22, 2020), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020
/04/22/leadership-resiliency-in-an-emergency [https://perma.cc/A5GY-RZ6U].
6 Id.
7 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.03.
8 See Gregory et al., supra note 5.
9 See infra Parts II, III.
10 See Bishop et al., supra note 2 (“The current COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the importance of emergency planning for businesses. For example,
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is but one unprecedented emergency that has forced companies
to consider their emergency provisions; global diseases, conflicts
and war, and the increasing rate of natural disasters as a result
of climate change will necessitate that companies take emergency
bylaws seriously.11
In this Note, Parts I and II will examine model and state
statutes regarding emergency bylaws and powers.12 Part III will
then examine the need for better emergency bylaw statutes and
adoption rates given the acceleration of global crises.13 Part IV
will highlight current issues with emergency bylaw statutes and
regulation, and Part V will give several recommendations to
state lawmakers and regulatory agencies that will facilitate the
effectiveness of emergency bylaw statutes and their impacts on
corporate governance.14
I.THE MBCA APPROACH TO EMERGENCY BYLAWS AND POWERS
A. The Model Business Corporation Act
The American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) is a model code for state corporate codes;15
thirty-three states have implemented either the 1984 or 2016
iteration of the MBCA as of July 2019.16 Additionally, the MBCA
is influential beyond the thirty-three states that have adopted it;
many other states pull language directly from the MBCA’s provisions for their own corporate codes.17 Since its inception in 1950,

physical limitations or governmental action may prevent directors from meeting or attaining a quorum or may cause key members of management to be
unreachable or unable to act on behalf the corporation.”).
11 See Henry Fountain, Climate Change Is Accelerating, Bringing World ‘Dangerously Close’ to Irreversible Change, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/climate/climate-change-acceleration.html
[https://
perma.cc/6WZK-8N4Z].
12 See infra Parts I, II.
13 See infra Part III.
14 See infra Parts IV, V.
15 See Model Business Corporation Act (2016 Revision) Launches, BUS. L.
TODAY (Jan. 19, 2017), https://businesslawtoday.org/2017/01/model-business
-corporation-act-2016-revision-launches [https://perma.cc/9LA4-WU9S].
16 Corporate Laws Committee, AM. BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/business_law/committees/corplaws [https://perma.cc/7FY4-W73W].
17 See infra Part III.
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the ABA has issued fully revised versions of the MBCA three times:
in 1969, 1984, and 2016.18 The MBCA first featured emergency bylaws and emergency powers clauses as separate concepts in its
1984 revision, and each edition since has featured some version
of these two provisions.19
B. Emergency Bylaws in the MBCA
The emergency bylaws section of the MBCA, section 2.07,
allows companies to adopt emergency bylaws, which “may make
all provisions necessary for managing the corporation during an
emergency.”20 Though the MBCA section gives a nonexhaustive
list of possible provisions that boards can adopt, companies can
also create and tailor specific emergency bylaws for their needs.21
Any emergency bylaws that companies choose to adopt preempt
that company’s standard bylaws only when they directly contradict;
all unaffected bylaws remain operational during an emergency.22
Emergency bylaws are subject to repeal by the shareholders.23 They trigger when the emergency begins and end when
the emergency ends.24 The MBCA section further imposes a good
faith standard on corporate action taken within the scope of
emergency bylaws.25 The comment to the MBCA explains that
this provision is intended “[t]o encourage corporations to adopt
emergency bylaws.”26
Importantly, the MBCA defines an emergency as a situation in which “a quorum of the board of directors cannot readily
be assembled because of some catastrophic event.”27 There is no

See Model Business Corporation Act (2016 Revision) Launches, supra
note 15.
19 STATE BAR OF CAL., CORP. COMM., BUS. L. SEC., PROPOSAL TO AMEND
SECTIONS 207 AND 212 OF CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CODE 2 (2012).
20 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016).
21 Id. These possible provisions include changing procedures for calling board
meetings, adjusting quorum requirements, and designating “additional or substitute directors.” Id.
22 § 2.07(b).
23 § 2.07(a).
24 § 2.07(a)–(b).
25 § 2.07(c).
26 § 2.07 cmt.
27 § 2.07(d).
18
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guidance as to how this applies to remote meetings, and “catastrophic event” intentionally covers a wide range of events.28 This
definition also means that one corporation could experience an
emergency while another in the same state would not: a corporate jet crash in Georgia that killed most of a company’s board,
for example, was a “catastrophic event” and therefore an emergency for that company alone.29
C. Emergency Powers in the MBCA
The comments to section 2.07 explain that even if a corporation chooses not to adopt emergency bylaws, the board of the
corporation “may nevertheless exercise the powers described in
section 3.03 [emergency powers] in the event of an emergency.”30
The emergency powers section, section 3.03, unlike section 2.07,
gives boards power to do certain things during and “[i]n anticipation of ... an emergency.”31 In the MBCA context, this stands
in contrast to emergency bylaws, which are only applicable during an emergency.32
The MBCA’s emergency powers provision allows boards to
change lines of succession or relocate offices before or during an
emergency.33 Companies do not need to have adopted emergency
bylaw provisions to use these powers.34 Additionally, as long as
a company’s emergency bylaws do not say otherwise, during an
emergency a board can give notice of a meeting, in any practicable manner, to only the board members whom it is practicable to
reach.35 Moreover, a board can deem any present officers to be
directors in order to achieve a quorum.36 Section 3.03 contains
the same good faith protection and emergency definition as section 2.07.37


§ 2.07 cmt.
29 Id.; see infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
30 § 2.07 cmt.
31 § 3.03(a).
32 § 2.07(a)–(b).
33 § 3.03(a).
34 § 3.03 cmt.
35 § 3.03(b).
36 Id.
37 See § 3.03(c)–(d); § 2.07(c)–(d).
28
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II.STATE APPROACHES TO EMERGENCY BYLAWS AND POWERS
Though all states borrow some language and ideas from the
MBCA, some states have unique emergency bylaw and powers
statutes,38 some states have no statutes at all,39 and others have
emergency bylaw statutes only for domestic insurers and no provisions for corporations in general.40 Additionally, several notable
states have unique emergency bylaw statutes.41
A. Delaware
Delaware’s emergency bylaw and powers provisions are
rolled into section 110 of the state’s corporate code.42 Delaware has
very similar emergency power provisions to the MBCA,43 as well
as very similar good faith standards44 and timing provisions.45
Delaware, however, made several changes to emergency bylaws
in direct response to the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020.46 Before the
changes, which were enacted on July 16, 2020 and applied retroactively to January 1, 2020, the definition of “emergency” was:
[A]ny emergency resulting from an attack on the United States
or on a locality in which the corporation conducts its business ...
or during any nuclear or atomic disaster, or during the existence of any catastrophe, or other similar emergency condition,
as a result of which a quorum of the board of directors ... cannot readily be convened.47

This definition, slightly broader than the MBCA, was
changed substantially to adjust to COVID-19.48 The current, updated code defines “emergency” as:

See, e.g., infra Part II.
39 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A (2020).
40 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.69.660 (West 2020).
41 See infra Sections II.A–II.C.
42 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110 (West 2020).
43 Id. § 110(b)–(c), (f)–(g); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.03(a)–(b) (AM. BAR
ASS’N, amended 2016).
44 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(d); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.03(c).
45 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(e); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.03.
46 See H.B. 341, 150th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2019).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
48 See id.
38
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[A]ny emergency resulting from an attack on the United
States or on a locality in which the corporation conducts its
business ... or during any nuclear or atomic disaster, or during
the existence of any catastrophe, including, but not limited to,
an epidemic or pandemic, and a declaration of a national emergency by the United States government, or other similar emergency condition, irrespective of whether a quorum of the board
of directors ... can readily be convened.49

Though this change explicitly mentions an “epidemic or
pandemic,”50 the most notable change by far is Delaware’s disposal
of the language: “as a result of which a quorum of the board of
directors ... cannot readily be convened,” 51 which is present in
nearly every other states’ emergency bylaws statutes.52 This gives
companies extremely wide authority to use emergency bylaws,
as it eliminates the confusing and vague element of whether a
board can be “readily convened.”53
The Delaware legislature also added a lengthy subsection
to section 110 in the same round of changes, mainly to give corporations more agency in dealing with shareholder obligations.54
On March 17, 2020 (and as edited on April 7, 2020), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Division of Corporation
Finance released staff guidance regarding notice for remote shareholder meetings.55 Given the challenges of COVID-19, many corporations needed to change their annual shareholder meetings
to a virtual or remote format, often with little time to make such
a change.56 To facilitate this change, the SEC gave a set of rules
relaxing how companies had to send proxy cards and other materials to change to a remote meeting.57

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
51 Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(a) (West 2020).
52 See infra Section IV.A.
53 See infra Section IV.A.
54 See H.B. 341, 150th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Del. 2019).
55 See Staff Guidance for Conducting Shareholder Meetings in Light of COVID19 Concerns, SEC ANNOUNCEMENT (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/ocr
/staff-guidance-conducting-annual-meetings-light-covid-19-concerns [https://
perma.cc/464A-ZW2E].
56 Id.
57 Id. (In light of [the difficulties of changing meeting format], the staff will
take the position that an issuer that has already mailed and filed its definitive proxy materials can notify shareholders of a change in the date, time, or
49
50
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Section 110 was amended to account for this change during
an emergency.58 Mainly, the change to the Delaware Code allowed the board to change the location of a shareholder meeting
during an emergency (presumably to a remote format) solely by
filing relevant documents with the SEC.59 The code dictates that
a corporation then must give stockholders further notice “as
promptly as practicable thereafter.”60
The amendment also allows corporations to change the
record and payment dates of dividends during an emergency,
provided that shareholders are notified “as promptly as practicable
thereafter” and that such a change is allowable by the SEC.61
The amendment also clarifies that no shareholder meeting could
be changed or cancelled simply because a stock list was not available in time due to the emergency.62 These changes give companies more flexibility in an emergency as well as the authority to
postpone or alter corporate obligations to shareholders during
an emergency.63
B. California
California’s emergency bylaws and powers statutes mostly
track the MBCA’s provisions but differ markedly in several significant ways.64 California’s statutes use a long and specific definition
of an emergency, which defines an emergency as a natural disaster (of which a nonexhaustive list of examples is included); an
actual or imminent attack; a state of emergency; or any manmade

location of its shareholder meeting without mailing additional soliciting materials or amending its proxy materials if it: issues a press release announcing
such change; files the announcement as definitive additional soliciting material on EDGAR; and takes all reasonable steps necessary to inform other intermediaries in the proxy process ... and other relevant market participants ... of
such change.).
58 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(i) (West 2020).
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 212(c)(1), (3)–(4), 207(i)(1)–(4) (West 2020); MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 2.07(a)–(c), 3.03(a)–(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016).
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disaster that results in mass casualties, damage, or destruction.65
Like Delaware, California’s definition does not include the MBCA
requirement that a quorum not be readily convenable, and California’s categories, though specific, are wide enough to conceivably
catch most emergency situations.66
California’s emergency bylaws statute includes one very
limiting clause that is not present in any other state’s statute:
“[d]uring an emergency, the board may not take any action that
requires the vote of the shareholders or is not in the corporation’s ordinary course of business, unless the required vote of the
shareholders was obtained prior to the emergency.”67 This limitation severely hamstrings corporate action by acting contrary to
the point of emergency bylaws: to facilitate corporate action in an
emergency situation.68 The “ordinary course of business” restriction
is equally confounding; as one firm aptly puts it, “[t]he ... restriction is inexplicable because an emergency might be just the
very time when a board should take action outside of the corporation’s ordinary course of business.”69
The convoluted emergency bylaw statute aside, California
also provides an emergency bylaw statute for domestic insurers.70
Domestic insurers face neither of the unique restrictions noted
above in the corporate code; their actions do not need shareholder
approval, and the bylaws can contain “any provision ... reasonably
necessary for the operation” of the insurance company.71 Insurance
companies therefore have much wider agency to create emergency

CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(i)(5).
See id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07(d).
67 CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(i)(3).
68 See, e.g., William Ross, Corporate Governance in California During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, HIRSCHFIELD KRAMER (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www
.hkemploymentlaw.com/blog/corporate-governance-in-california-during-the-covid
-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc/7NGT-6SU3] (“Since it is likely that an emergency would give rise to circumstances that are highly unusual, the limitation as to the corporation’s ordinary course of business is unfortunate.”);
Keith Bishop et al., Does This California Statute Arbitrarily Shackle Corporate Boards In Times of Emergency?, JD SUPRA (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www
.jdsupra.com/legalnews/does-this-california-statute-16582 [https://perma.cc
/B39K-S33L].
69 CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(i)(3); see Bishop et al., supra note 68.
70 CAL. INS. CODE § 688.1 (West 2020).
71 Id.
65
66
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bylaws, though this standard is simply more aligned with that of
the MBCA.72
California’s insurance code also gives a set of emergency
bylaws that apply during an emergency to all domestic insurers
that have not adopted their own emergency bylaws.73 These default provisions set the number of directors that can constitute a
quorum (three), describe how to fill board vacancies, and give a
succession plan in the event that there are no surviving directors.74
Insurance companies can override these default provisions by
adopting their own emergency bylaws.75 These default provisions
are the same ones generally adopted by other states that have
default emergency bylaws for domestic insurers.76
C. New York
New York’s emergency bylaw statute is disorganized at
New York’s corporate code mentions emergency bylaws
briefly, giving corporations the power “[t]o adopt, amend or repeal
by-laws, including emergency by-laws made pursuant to ... the
state defense emergency act, relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, its rights or powers or the rights
or powers of its shareholders, directors or officers.”78 The section
referred to by the corporate code, strangely situated in New York’s
Defense Emergency Act, gives corporations generally the same powers as the MBCA, except that there is no good faith protection.79
The Defense Emergency Act, still in operation, was established in 1951 to prepare for the threat of attack on the United
States by a Communist nation and was in response to President
Truman’s state of emergency declaration during the Korean War.80

best.77


See id.; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016).
73 CAL. INS. CODE § 688.2.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.69.660 (West 2020).
77 See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9112(17) (McKinney 2020).
78 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 202(11) (McKinney 2020).
79 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9112(17); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07 (AM. BAR
ASS’N, amended 2016).
80 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9102 (“In view of the professed determination of
the government of the United States to resist further communist aggression,
72
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The Act’s express purpose is “to minimize the hardship resulting
from these dislocations, and to permit the fullest participation by
the people of this state in the defense effort .... It is the purpose
of this legislation to meet these dangers and problems with the least
possible interference ....”81 The Act seems to still operate even
though the need for the Act probably ended after the partial disarmament at the end of the Cold War, given its stated purpose.82
Given the provision’s location in the Emergency Defense
Act, it is unsurprising that New York’s emergency bylaws are
only applicable during an attack.83 An attack is defined as “[a]ny
attack, actual or imminent, or series of attacks by an enemy or a
foreign nation upon the United States causing, or which may cause,
substantial damage or injury to civilian property or persons in
the United States.”84 This makes sense, as this statute is in New
York’s Defense Emergency Act.85
New York’s Defense Emergency Act also contains an emergency bylaw provision for domestic insurers, which is mostly
similar to the statute for corporations, except that domestic insurers have a different emergency definition, and insurer emergency bylaws require superintendent approval.86 All emergency
bylaws must be approved by the Superintendent of Financial
Services.87 They apply in an “acute emergency,” which is a much
wider definition than for corporations.88 An acute emergency is:
[A] period in which, by reason of loss of life, epidemic disease,
destruction or damage of property, contamination of property
by radiological, chemical or bacteriological means, or disruption
of the means of transportation and communication, resulting from
an attack ... it is impossible or impracticable for the business


and because of the likelihood of resort to atomic and radiological weapons in
the event of further conflict between this nation and communist aggressors,
the peril to the people of this state is sufficiently great that the precautions
embodied in this act must be taken.”).
81 Id.
82 See The End of the Cold War, NEB. STUDS., https://www.nebraskastudies
.org/en/1975-1999/the-end-of-the-cold-war [https://perma.cc/D8UE-TN56].
83 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9129.
84 § 9103.
85 Id.
86 §§ 9112(17), 9177(1).
87 § 9177(1).
88 § 9176(1)(d).
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of insurance in this state to be conducted in strict accord with
the provisions of law or “charters” applicable thereto.89

D. Other States
Some states have adopted the MBCA but with their own
modifications.90 Florida, for example, uses the MBCA provisions
nearly verbatim, with a few additions.91 The most notable change
is the addition of a subsection stating that “[n]o officer, director,
or employee acting in accordance with any emergency bylaws
shall be liable except for willful or intentional misconduct.” 92
This expands the MBCA’s good faith protections for company
officers during an emergency to cover all behavior other than
willful misconduct.93
Illinois, a state with unique emergency bylaw provisions,
has the same general emergency bylaw provisions as the MBCA.94
Its emergency definition for all corporations (presumably including
insurance companies), however, limits the use of emergency bylaws to a state or national declaration of civil defense emergency
due to an impending attack.95 Illinois has a separate definition
for just insurance companies, allowing insurance companies to
adopt emergency bylaws that would be operational during an
emergency resulting from an attack on the United States, no official declaration necessary.96 It is unclear if this difference is
intentional or not, but the interpretation could give insurance
companies wider latitude in using emergency bylaws than other
types of corporations.97

Id.
90 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-207 (2020); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0303
(West 2020).
91 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 607.0207, 607.0303; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 2.07,
3.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016).
92 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0303(4).
93 See id.
94 See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.30 (West 2020); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 2.07.
95 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2.30.
96 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/155.06.
97 See id.
89
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E. Timing of Emergency Bylaw Statute Adoption
There does not seem to be any evidence that states adopted
their emergency bylaw or powers statutes in response to any particular emergency.98 However, states have changed their emergency
bylaw statutes to reflect emergency situations.99 Delaware is by
far the most notable example, 100 but Georgia also adapted its
emergency bylaw statute in response to a corporate plane crash
in 1991.101 Previously, Georgia’s definition of an emergency was
limited to nuclear attack or another similar emergency.102 After
a plane crash killed five top executives of an Alabama corporation,103 Georgia changed its definition of an emergency to match
the MBCA, specifically noting that this change “could cover a
crash of a corporate jet.”104

III.THE INCREASING NEED FOR EMERGENCY BYLAWS
Emergency bylaws are by nature only useful during an
emergency, and the recent COVID-19 pandemic was such a situation for many companies.105 Though pandemics are formidable
emergencies for companies,106 other crises, such as war107 and
climate change,108 can also prompt situations during which emergency bylaws would be a key tool for corporations.


See supra Part II.
99 See, e.g., infra notes 101–04 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
101 GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-207 cmt. (2020).
102 Id.
103 Ronald Smothers, Crash of Private Plane in Georgia Kills 9, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/12/us/crash-of-private-plane
-in-georgia-kills-9.html [https://perma.cc/7Q7B-RQM4].
104 GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-207 cmt.; see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07(d)
(AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2016).
105 See Bishop et al., supra note 2.
106 See infra Section IV.A.
107 See infra Section III.B.
108 See infra Section III.C.
98
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A. Global Diseases
Despite the popular concept that a global pandemic is a oncein-a-lifetime event, this may no longer be true.109 For a variety of
reasons, including urbanization, climate change, global travel, and
increased human-animal contact, global diseases and pandemics
are likely to become more prevalent.110 As humans push further
into natural areas, habitat loss forces animals closer to human
settlements.111 This increases the likelihood of disease outbreaks:
“There is no great mystery about the cause of ... any modern
pandemic,” said Dr. Peter Daszak, President of EcoHealth Alliance .... “The same human activities that drive climate change
and biodiversity loss also drive pandemic risk through their
impacts on our environment. Changes in the way we use land;
the expansion and intensification of agriculture; and unsustainable trade, production and consumption disrupt nature and
increase conduct between wildlife, livestock, pathogens and people. This is the path to pandemics.”112

There are currently about 1.7 million unidentified viruses
in mammals and birds, about half of which could impact humans.113
Especially in the crowded, quickly growing cities of Asia and
Africa, pandemics will spread more quickly and kill more people.114 Financially, global diseases post-COVID-19 will cost the

See Victoria Gill, Coronavirus: This Is Not the Last Pandemic, BBC
(June 6, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-52775386 [https://
perma.cc/NM2C-3VXT].
110 5 Reasons Why Pandemics Like COVID-19 Are Becoming More Likely,
GAVI (June 10, 2020), https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/5-reasons-why-pan
demics-like-covid-19-are-becoming-more-likely [https://perma.cc/M2SJ-Q23Y].
111 Josef Settele et al., COVID-19 Stimulus Measures Must Save Lives, Protect
Livelihoods, and Safeguard Nature to Reduce the Risk of Future Pandemics,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI.-POL’Y PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM
SERVS. (Oct. 29, 2020), https://ipbes.net/covid19stimulus [https://perma.cc
/YYQ3-2Z38].
112 Escaping the ‘Era of Pandemics’: Experts Warn Worse Crises to Come,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCI.-POL’Y PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM
SERVS., https://ipbes.net/pandemics [https://perma.cc/7GQG-FUMD].
113 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PLATFORM ON BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM SERVS.,
IPBES WORKSHOP ON BIODIVERSITY AND PANDEMICS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
(2020) [hereinafter IPBES WORKSHOP].
114 Id. at 6.
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global economy an estimated trillion dollars a year in economic
damages.115 In the United States alone, COVID-19 will have cost
the economy an estimated $16 trillion by the end of 2021. 116
Given the huge human capital and financial costs of global diseases, pandemics provide ample reason for corporations to adopt
emergency bylaws now.117
B. Terrorist Attacks, Wars, and Global Conflict
Terrorist attacks, wars, and global conflict can all destabilize
companies’ normal operations to the extent to which emergency
bylaws could be useful.118
For example, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
showcased the need for emergency bylaws. 119 Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee, highlighted the September 11 attacks as a catalyst for her recommendation that companies have emergency bylaws.120 The attacks
showed how unprepared corporations were for such a large scale
disruption: “it was clear that business continuity planning had
not fully taken into account the potential for wide-area disasters
and for major loss or inaccessibility of critical staff.”121

Id.
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 See Tyler Mark, Emergency Bylaws—Considerations in Light of the COVID19 Pandemic and Beyond, LEXOLOGY LLP (June 15, 2020), https://www.lex
ology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bd9e7304-ff60-409e-a0f9-522674b7d63d [https://
perma.cc/EXE3-4Q4Z].
119 Summary of “Lessons Learned” from Events of September 11 and Implications for Business Continuity, SEC (Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter Lessons
Learned], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/lessonslearned.htm [https://
perma.cc/MZU4-HNMS].
120 Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, Boards Adopt Emergency Bylaws for Critical Flexibility, AGENDA (Apr. 22, 2020), https://3epjwm3sm3iv250i67219jhow
pengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Bylaws.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FK2G-4NHJ]. This article, though helpful, is not updated to
account for Delaware’s July 16, 2020, changes. See id.
121 See Lessons Learned, supra note 119. This effect was compounded by the
concentration of businesses in the World Trade Center and the relative novelty
of such a large attack. Id.
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More specifically, terrorist attacks like those on September 11 can disrupt communication, strand or isolate key employees,
destroy essential physical capital and databases, and otherwise
impede the regular course of a business.122 Emergency bylaws
could ensure that corporations can maintain communications and
operations during a terrorist attack of any scale.123 The same need
for emergency bylaws also applies to attacks as a part of more
formal warfare against the United States.124
Global conflicts, whether or not the United States is directly affected, can also impact corporate operations.125 Though
most states’ statutes account for the event of an attack on the
United States, the Delaware statute, for example, also triggers
emergency bylaws after an attack “on a locality in which the corporation conducts its business ... or during any nuclear or atomic
disaster.” 126 This means that companies in some states could
theoretically use their emergency bylaws to respond to emergencies in other countries in which the company operates.127
C. Global Warming
Global warming has a variety of long-term consequences
for human rights, the environment, and human infrastructure.128
Economically, scientists predict that global warming will increasingly
and negatively impact supply chains, availability of goods, and
market stability due to extreme climate related events.129 Though
these long-term economic effects are important considerations for

Paul A. Argenti, Crisis Communication: Lessons from 9/11, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Dec. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/12/crisis-communication-lessons-from-911
[https://perma.cc/BB6R-4X2Z].
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 See, e.g., Kislaya Prasad, The Fight Over Kashmir Has Business Consequences, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 28, 2019, 5:42 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news
/best-countries/articles/2019-03-28/commentary-how-business-thrive-in-times
-of-international-conflict [https://perma.cc/3UYB-5RQU].
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(a) (West 2020).
127 See id.
128 See Fountain, supra note 11.
129 U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: IMPACT, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORTIN-BRIEF 107 (2018) [hereinafter CLIMATE ASSESSMENT].
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businesses, the relevant effect of global warming for emergency
bylaws is the growth of climate change related disasters.130
Global warming is the phenomenon of rising average temperatures worldwide as a result of human activities, mostly fossil
fuel burning.131 Human activities are estimated to have increased
the global average temperature by about 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit
since about 1850.132 The majority of this change occurred within
the last seventy years, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) predicts that over the next 100 years, the average annual temperature could increase anywhere between 2.5
and 10 degrees Fahrenheit.133
Global warming provides a host of logistical problems for
countries and individuals, but for businesses considering emergency bylaws, the increased risk of disastrous events is the most
important problem.134 Global warming can make wildfires worse,
create more intense hurricanes and storms, and exacerbate
droughts.135 All of these events could cause board members to
become unavailable, prompting an “emergency” under the MBCA
definition.136 These are also emergencies within Delaware’s new
definition, and so companies could want wider latitude in continuing operations during such events.137
These events are also exacerbated by other factors and
vary from region to region.138 In the Northeast, aging infrastructure is likely to be more vulnerable to storms and their resulting
storm surges, high winds, and precipitation.139 Importantly, “[l]oss
of public services affects the capacity of communities to function
as administrative and economic centers and triggers disruptions
of interconnected supply chains.”140 The risk of incapacity in the

See infra Section III.C.
Overview: Weather, Global Warming, and Climate Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN. (Dec. 16, 2020), https://climate.nasa.gov/resources
/global-warming-vs-climate-change [https://perma.cc/X234-KDCJ].
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133 The Effects of Climate Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.
(Dec. 16, 2020), https://climate.nasa.gov/effects [https://perma.cc/TP7H-DC2M].
134 See CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 129, at 12.
135 Fountain, supra note 11.
136 See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
137 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 110(a) (West 2020).
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major northeastern cities of Boston, Philadelphia, New York City,
and Washington, D.C. could be disastrous for companies.141
The Southeast and U.S. Caribbean are particularly vulnerable to heat waves, coastal flooding, and violent storms.142 The
Midwest and Great Plains’ roles as major suppliers of foodstuffs
in the United States could be threatened by droughts and storms
alike: By 2100, adapting storm water systems in the Midwest to
accommodate the increasingly severe storms will cost an estimated $500 million annually.143
The Pacific Coast is already facing the impacts of global
warming, with increasingly disastrous wildfires, landslides,
droughts, heatwaves, and flooding.144 The impacts of these are
felt by companies, especially insurers: wildfires in 2018 cost insurers an estimated $20 billion in claims.145
The winter storm in Texas and Oklahoma in February 2021
highlighted the vulnerabilities of infrastructure to extreme weather
events.146 The winter storm, uncommon in Texas, paralyzed the
power grid and ground the economy to a stand-still.147 For example,
the storm halted one-third of American oil production.148 The experience of Texas is a warning sign for other states as to the consequences of infrastructure that is ill-adapted to extreme weather.149
These emergency risks do not exist in isolation; all three are
interconnected.150 Global warming can not only cripple economies
but also exacerbate conflict; it also creates climate refugees who flee
newly uninhabitable land151 and increases prices and competition

See id.
Id. at 121, 127.
143 Id. at 132, 137.
144 Id. at 145, 150.
145 Timothy Rooks, West Coast Fires Will Cost US Economy Dearly, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.dw.com/en/economic-impact-california-wild
fires-us-west-coast/a-54956210 [https://perma.cc/7PAC-F39P].
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Waiting to Happen, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com
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150 See CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 129, at 12.
151 Climate change and disaster displacement, U.N. HIGH COMM’N FOR
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for resources, both of which increase the likelihood of conflict.152
Climate change and its biological and human effects accelerate
both the risk and spread of pandemics.153 Though research is limited by past pandemics, COVID-19 has also made peacekeeping
efforts less likely to succeed and given governments an opportunity to tighten control, further aggravating global conflict.154
IV.CONCERNS ABOUT EMERGENCY BYLAW STATUTES
Given the increasing need for emergency bylaw provisions,
the MBCA and many states’ statutes are inefficient at giving
corporations much needed flexibility during an emergency.155
A. The Definition of “Emergency”
The definition of an emergency which the MBCA (and most
states) uses includes the requirement that a quorum of a board
is not readily convenable.156 This requirement is vague at best
and has the potential to be unclear given that remote board

CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, supra note 129, at 108 (“[C]limate variability has
been shown to affect conflict through intermediate processes, including resource
competition, commodity price shocks, and food insecurity.”).
153 IPBES WORKSHOP, supra note 113, at 6 (“Climate change has been implicated in disease emergence (e.g., tick-borne encephalitis in Scandinavia)
and will likely cause substantial future pandemic risk by driving movement
of people, wildlife, reservoirs, and vectors, and spread of their pathogens, in
ways that lead to new contact among species.”).
154 Katariina Mustasilta, The Effects of the Global COVID-19 Pandemic on
Peace and Conflict, INT’L PEACE INST. GLOB. OBSERVATORY (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/10/effects-of-covid-19-pandemic-on-peace
-conflict/ [https://perma.cc/7D5Z-PSDG] (“As global attention remains caught
up in fighting the pandemic and the policy measures restricting the movement of
people continue, both local and international peace efforts suffer .... Second,
policy responses to the pandemic give opportunities to state and non-state actors
alike to tighten or advance their power and undermine their opponents while
leaving civilians more exposed and vulnerable to violence .... In multiple relatively peaceful countries as well, state actors have taken concerning steps that
undermine human rights and threaten democratic institutions, using COVID-19
responses as a pretext.”); see also Katariina Mustasilta, From Bad to Worse?
The Impact(s) of COVID-19 on Conflict Dynamics, EUR. UNION INST. FOR SEC.
STUD. (June 11, 2020), https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/bad-worse-impacts
-covid-19-conflict-dynamics [https://perma.cc/Y827-2ZJ6].
155 See supra Section V.B.
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meetings are now not uncommon.157 Nearly every state allows remote corporate board meetings (or at least is silent on the issue), ensuring that boards are ostensibly “convenable” in most situations.158
The current MBCA definition seems to suggest that an emergency only exists if a quorum cannot be easily convened either
because not enough directors are alive or because not enough are
reachable by telephone or internet.159 While the inclusion of the
adverb “readily” might water down the limiting nature of the statute, it still seems counterintuitive that the emergency definition
would be so limiting in light of the rise of remote meetings, given
the MBCA’s intent that companies adopt emergency bylaws.160
B. Shareholders’ Rights
The risk of danger to shareholders’ rights posed by emergency bylaws is out of the scope of this Note, but is important to
mention. Emergency bylaws allow corporate officers to act with
some impunity: those acting within emergency bylaws are shielded
from liability so long as they act in good faith.161 Florida, for
example, additionally says that no employee, director, or officer
acting within the emergency bylaws can be liable for anything
other than willful or intentional misconduct.162 Also important,
emergency powers statutes, given by state law, are not subject to
shareholder repeal or amendment, and so boards automatically

See COVID-19 Has Moved You to Virtual Board Meetings—Is That Even
Legal?, ONBOARD (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.passageways.com/blog/covid-19
-has-moved-you-to-virtual-board-meetings-is-that-even-legal [https://perma.cc
/UKB5-GTNQ].
158 Are Virtual Board and Committee Meetings Legal?, ONBOARD, https://
www.passageways.com/board-portal/virtual-board-meetings-law?utm_medium=
Website&utm_source=Social&utm_campaign=Blog&utm_term=blog&utm_con
tent=virtualmeetings1-blog-03172020 [https://perma.cc/G5FV-RTW3]. Though
this source uses the title “virtual,” it is important to note that board meetings
by phone, for example, would suffice for a valid board meeting, as most states
require simply that all participants can hear one another simultaneously. Id.
“Remote” is therefore a more accurate term than “virtual,” which implies the
use of the Internet. See id.
159 See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07(d).
160 Id. § 2.07 cmt.
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have several delegated powers during an emergency with limited shareholder interference.163
Additionally, shareholders can repeal or amend emergency
bylaw provisions.164 However, shareholders may not understand
the full power granted to the board during an emergency until an
emergency has occurred, and at that point it may be difficult for
shareholders to vote to repeal or amend the emergency bylaws.165
This is due both to shareholders individually dealing with the ramifications of an emergency, as well as limits imposed by a remote
shareholder meeting format.166
Changed shareholders meetings, which may have to be held
remotely due to an emergency situation, may limit shareholders’
ability to directly confront the board about these emergency bylaw provisions, further hindering shareholders’ rights.167 In 2020,
more than 1,000 American companies conducted remote shareholder meetings, as compared to fewer than 300 in 2019.168 This
explosion was presumably due to COVID-19.169 The limitation of
shareholder ability to address emergency bylaw provisions may be
both because of a lack of face-to-face confrontation with the board,
as well as the risk of the company potentially filtering presubmitted
shareholder complaints.170 Also, Delaware’s new requirement that
companies need only file applicable change-of-location documents
with the SEC to change to a remote meeting, then give notice

REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.03.
164 Id. § 2.07(a).
165 Note that methods for shareholder voting vary from company to company.
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perma.cc/XW7C-SZUE].
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“as soon as practicable thereafter” may cause very short notice
of a remote meeting for shareholders.171
Finally, once the board has acted in accordance with the
bylaws, the good faith protections may make lawsuits regarding
corporate action difficult.172
C. Disclosure of Emergency Bylaw Operation
Shareholders’ rights are also at risk given that regulation
does not yet seem to contemplate emergency bylaws.173 Though
shareholder rights can be drastically altered by the triggering of
emergency bylaw statutes,174 there is no specified disclosure required by the SEC for the operation of emergency bylaws, only
for adoption of them.175 Some events as a result of the emergency
or the triggering of the emergency bylaws may qualify under certain events in Form 8-K.176 This might include departure or appointment of certain offices (Item 5.02) for example, but there is
no specific item which would necessitate that a company alert
shareholders as to the operation of the emergency bylaws. 177
Item 5.03 (“Amendments to Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws”)
almost seems to be the right fit, but the triggering of emergency
bylaws is not an amendment, only the original adoption of the
provisions is.178 The best shareholders could hope for is that companies elect to alert them to the usage of emergency bylaws using Item 8.01 (Other Events).179 However, disclosure under Item
8.01 is entirely at a corporation’s discretion.180 As it stands, it
does not seem like emergency bylaw usage has raised any flags
among shareholder advocates, but it is an important consideration moving forward.
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172 See REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.07 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
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174 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, 110.
175 See SEC, Form 8-K, supra note 173, at 17.
176 Id. at 15.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 17.
179 Id. at 21.
180 Id.
171

650 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:627
V.RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EMERGENCY BYLAW STATUTES
State statutes should align more with Delaware’s statute to
allow for more corporate flexibility during emergencies.181 Companies simply should have emergency bylaws, and tailor them
specifically to the company’s needs and their geographic area’s
challenges.
A. Recommendations for States
State statutes must be clarified to help corporations adopt
and use effective emergency bylaws.182 Delaware’s newly edited
statute provides a model for other states: the elimination of the
“readily convened for action” requirement allows for more flexibility in what counts as an emergency.183 However, this broader
definition of an emergency may come at the cost of shareholder
rights, a discussion outside the scope of this Note.184 It also may
allow corporations to trigger their emergency bylaws for any emergency in a locale where the business operates, a broad range of
locations for many corporations.185
With the definition of an emergency expanding, the MBCA
128 provision that emergency bylaws are subject to repeal by
shareholders becomes an even more important check on corporate power.186
States may have some incentive to adapt their corporate
codes to more closely resemble Delaware’s.187 In fact, there is an
established history of other states adopting Delaware’s corporate
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code changes.188 Even minute changes in corporate power can be
important as states attempt to lure company incorporation away
from Delaware with corporation friendly policies.189
B. Recommendations for Corporations
Corporations’ best course of action regarding emergency
bylaws is to have them. A majority of corporations do not have
emergency bylaws.190 While emergency bylaw provisions may be
more common in the financial services industry, every industry
could benefit from their inclusion.191 Only about one-fifth of S&P
500 corporations have emergency bylaw provisions, though this
number is not current given the challenge of COVID-19.192 Given the advantage that emergency bylaws give to boards during
emergencies, the companies with these provisions have an advantage over companies who do not.193 To stay competitive in an
emergency and to ensure continuing of operations, more companies should adopt these provisions.194
MasterCard, for example, adopted emergency bylaws in
response to COVID-19.195 The changes allowed board members
to call meetings “by any feasible means” and to invite only whoever can be reasonably reached, as well as allowing any present
director to constitute a quorum.196
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Companies should be careful with their provisions, especially
ones beyond those enumerated in state statutes.197 Companies
should tailor them to their regional and corporate needs.198 “For
boards, there’s risk when adopting these provisions in not thinking through the process carefully enough ... care should be devoted to looking at how [emergency bylaws] will play out in an
emergency.”199 Though the risks of poorly drafted emergency bylaws are not clear, as there is so little precedent, Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee, puts
it most succinctly: “In not adopting [emergency bylaws], the risks
are pretty obvious.”200
CONCLUSION
Emergency bylaws are a powerful tool for boards to continue operations during an emergency. The MBCA provides one
guide for how states can write their emergency bylaws and powers statutes, and many states use the MBCA.201 However, the
MBCA’s definition of “emergency” is limited to catastrophes during which a quorum of the board cannot be readily assembled, a
potentially confusing definition especially given the rise of remote board meetings.202
Some states have adopted their own emergency bylaws and
powers statutes,203 with Delaware notably changing its statute
to account for challenges posed by COVID-19 and eliminating the
“cannot be readily assembled” language of the MBCA’s emergency
definition. 204 Delaware’s change should be a model for other
states to follow and can clarify the definition of “emergency.”205
While COVID-19 has shown the need for emergency bylaw adoption, it is by no means the only emergency which has
arisen or will arise necessitating emergency bylaws.206 Future
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pandemics, domestic and global conflict, and global warming all
will increase the need for emergency bylaws. 207 The interconnectedness of these issues will only exacerbate them, leading to
more disasters which will push companies’ abilities to govern
during catastrophes.208
Companies underutilize emergency bylaws and should adopt
209
them.
Companies should also consider how to tailor these
bylaws to best suit their needs and the potential disasters the
company will face.210 States should move toward Delaware’s model
of an emergency bylaw statute, as the MBCA’s emergency definition has not yet adapted to the possibility of remote meetings
and is vague and unhelpful.211
Though emergency bylaws are helpful, it is important to
note that their use could threaten shareholders’ rights, and that
the operation of emergency bylaw provisions does not yet have a
mandatory disclosure requirement with the SEC.212 As more companies adopt emergency bylaws and an evaluation of their efficacy is possible after the COVID-19 emergency in the United States
(hopefully) ends, companies will be able to gain a more thorough
understanding of how emergency bylaws operate and how they
can be most useful.
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